Toward an Integrative Approach: Refiguring Essential Developments In Family Therapy

In approaching the end of the twentieth century, the field of family therapy/psychology underwent what is referred to as the narrative turn (Bertrando, 2000; Botella & Herrero, 2000; Carr, 1998; Hoffman, 1993; Neimeyer & Mahoney, 1995; Phipps, 2004; Zimmerman & Dickerson, 1994). It was understood that, because we are unable to comprehend events objectively, all we can have are narratives about these events (Hoffman, 1993).

One approach that gained early ascendency during this turn is that of Michael White and David Epston (1990), an approach known as narrative therapy. The basic thesis of narrative therapy is that we tend to story our experience and when these stories are unrepresentative of our actual or lived experience, we face difficulties or problems (White, 1998). Accordingly, the role of the psychotherapist is to interpret how the client is storying his or her world, the attendant meaning, and then to help the client reauthor an alternative, more helpful story (White & Epston, 1990). Narrative therapy, itself, is based on a broader philosophical development known as postmodernism.

Postmodernism represents a highly significant philosophical development (Cloete, 2002; Hoffman, 1993; Moules, 2000; Phipps, 2004). Its main premise is that the act of knowing is interpretive or subjective and, thus, the knower is unable to acquire direct or objective knowledge (Benhabib, 1984; Cloete, 2002; Rorty, 1979).

The thesis in narrative therapy is, in keeping with postmodernism, that it is the knower who performs or interprets reality – in this instance by storying (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). Having incorporated such an important philosophical development, it now seemed that narrative therapy had eclipsed, if not replaced, a founding approach in family therapy, that is, systems theory/cybernetics (Bertrando, 2000; Botella & Herrero, 2000; Carr, 1998; Hoffman, 1993; Neimeyer & Mahoney, 1995; Patterson, 2014; Zimmerman & Dickerson, 1994).

This approach, which appeared in the 1950s, is based on the idea that when we observe phenomena together, rather than discretely, we discover how in combination they affect one another – we get to see their relationship or interaction (Bateson, 1979; Jackson, 1965; Keeney, 1983; Bertalanffy, 1968). Thus, not only did this approach emphasize the observation of behavior – an approach known as the interpsychic perspective – but it also placed the study of the individual in a broader, interactional context (Haley, 1963).

The emphasis in narrative therapy on interpreting the client’s story/ stories and its/their attendant meaning for him or her is consistent with what is referred to as the intrapsychic perspective (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). The intrapsychic perspective, which represents an early development in psychology, has to do with the investigation of subjective experience (Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967). This is distinct from the later interpsychic perspective that, as noted previously, limits observation to that of behavior (Watzlawick et al., 1967) – one of the hallmarks of systems theory/cybernetics.

The development from the intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective, as incorporated by systems theory/cybernetics, was significant because it elucidated a distinction between the observation of the individual’s behavior (i.e., interpsychic perspective) and inferences about the individual’s subjective experience (i.e., intrapsychic perspective); observation and description from the latter perspective, then, necessarily incurring the limitation of greater speculation (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).

The incorporation of an intrapsychic perspective in narrative therapy illustrates that narrative therapy has returned – considering that the intrapsychic perspective represents an earlier occurrence in psychology – to an earlier phase in the field’s development (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). Such a development, however, may have been acceptable, and even warranted, if the invocation of the intrapsychic perspective in narrative therapy were a logical and necessary consequence of postmodernism. This is not the case (Phipps & Vorster, 2015).

It does not follow logically that, because the individual’s perception is subjective (i.e., as per postmodernism), he or she should necessarily choose to infer about another’s subjective experience (i.e., intrapsychic perspective) rather than observe their behavior (i.e., interpsychic perspective; Phipps & Vorster, 2015). Put differently, observance of the postmodern assumption that the individual’s perception is necessarily subjective does not – contrary to what was previously suggested (Combs & Freedman, 1998) – eschew the need for adherence to an interpsychic perspective or the intrapsychic and interpsychic distinction for the purposes of observation (Phipps & Vorster, 2015).

In the final analysis, the move in family therapy to forego the development of the intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective and the emphasis on the interactional context may well have been premature (Phipps & Vorster, 2015).

The objective of this article is to refigure essential developments in the field of family therapy as a preliminary step toward developing an integrative (Kaslow & Lebow, 2004; Phipps, 2011, 2019; Phipps & Vorster, 2015; Vorster, 2003, 2011) psychotherapeutic approach. To accomplish this, it is first necessary to revisit two precursor developments, namely, the transition from the intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective, and from the lineal to nonlineal perspective.

Intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective

 As noted previously, the intrapsychic perspective constitutes an early development in psychology. It assumes there are processes inside – from Latin intra “inside” (“Intra-,” 2019) – the individual’s mind – psyche via Latin from Greek psykhē meaning “breath, life, soul,” in this context, “mind” (“Psyche,” 2019) – that are open to investigation (e.g., the psychoanalytic approach). The later interpsychic perspective, however, assumes the behavior between – inter from Old French enterrer, based on Latin in-“into” + terra “earth,” referring to “between” (“Inter,” 2019) – minds or people can be observed (e.g., the behavioral approach).

In distinguishing the observation of the individual’s behavior (i.e., the interpsychic perspective) from the inferences about an individual’s subjective experience (i.e., the intrapsychic perspective), the development from the intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective highlighted two distinct frames of reference for observation or description; both this distinction, itself, and the application of the latter perspective said to accent the value of careful and systematic observation (Phipps & Vorster, 2011; Vorster, 2003) – what Bertalanffy (1955, p. 253) noted as trained observation.

The conclusion above, however – which served as the prevailing thinking for many years – that the intrapsychic and interpsychic perspectives simply represent two distinct frames of reference, is somewhat limited and incomplete. Specifically, an inference (by definition) about the individual’s subjective experience (i.e., the intrapsychic perspective) is, in the first instance, based on the observation of the individual’s behavior. That an observation from the intrapsychic perspective is one step removed from that of the interpsychic perspective, indicates that the two perspectives do not represent a binary opposition but rather two logically distinct frames of reference (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). Ultimately, then, the significance of this development is that it helped to distinguish that the intrapsychic and interpsychic perspectives represent two logically distinct frames of reference for the purpose of observation or description. Given the importance of this issue, it will be examined in more detail further on.

Lineal to nonlineal perspective

The lineal (i.e., straight-line) perspective dates to the seventeenth-century physicist and mathematician, Isaac Newton (Bateson, 1960, 1972). It assumes that causal processes are arranged in a lineal sequence, otherwise referred to as lineal causality (Bateson, 1979; Jackson, 1965): One event unilaterally and independently causes another, that is, events are arranged in a lineal way. This perspective was adopted by various early approaches, including the psychoanalytic and behaviorist approaches (Keeney, 1983): Both approaches regard behavior as a function of a lineal (causal) relationship, be it the function of the individual and his or her psychological processes (i.e., the psychoanalytic approach) or the environment (i.e., the behaviorist approach; Keeney, 1983).

The nonlineal (i.e., circular) perspective, which emerged in the 1950s, assumes that just as causal processes can be arranged in a lineal sequence, so too can they be arranged in a nonlineal one. This perspective is based on what anthropologist Gregory Bateson (1979) referred to as recursive – or what Keeney (1983) denoted nonlineal – causality: Causal processes circle back to their starting point; no one event unilaterally or independently causes another, all the events are interdependent. Put differently, any event which is part of a circular chain is simultaneously cause and effect in relation to other events (Bateson, 1979, cited in Keeney, 1983).

The development from the lineal to nonlineal perspective represented a revolution in psychotherapy (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). It enabled the observation of phenomena in the context of a relationship, rather than on their own, that is, the observation of the interdependence of phenomena (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). Family (psycho-) therapists were thus able, for the first time, to observe interaction or – in the full sense of the word – relationship (Kaslow, 1996; Phipps & Vorster, 2011) – by undertaking what Bateson (1979) called double description: observing or describing both sides of a relationship simultaneously. Both developments were subsumed in systems theory/cybernetics.

General system theory (GST)

Toward the end of World War II, the idea emerged in the sciences that the observation of phenomena in the context of a relationship (i.e., as a whole) yielded observation that was altogether different – and could not be observed – from the observation of these phenomena on their own (i.e., as separate parts); the former thus enabling the observation of phenomena as a whole (von Bertalanffy, 1968). This thinking gave rise to several key developments, including GST and cybernetics.

GST – coined by German-Canadian biologist and philosopher Ludwig von Bertalanffy – involves the scientific exploration of wholes and wholeness, that is, the investigation of phenomena not just as (separate) parts but also as the relationship between the parts; this relationship constituting and being constituted by, the whole (von Bertalanffy, 1968). In addition, GST involves the assumption that a system, defined as a set of interacting elements (or parts), exhibits part-whole relations that are subject to general principles, which can be applied to the investigation of scientific phenomena (von Bertalanffy, 1968).

Cybernetics draws on the notion that it is feedback – the “return of information to form a closed control loop” (Papert, 1965, p. xvi, as cited in Keeney, 1983, p. 65) – that enables all purposeful behavior (Rosenblueth, Wiener, & Bigelow, 1943/1968, as cited in Keeney, 1983). Cybernetics – Greek cyber meaning steering or handling an oar (Hanson, 1995) – thus highlights the observed ability of a system to steer itself (Wiener, 1948, as cited in Hanson, 1995). Cybernetics then is about the processes by which a system self-regulates (Hanson, 1995). Cybernetics led to a further development known as second-order cybernetics.

Cybernetics of cybernetics, or what Foerster called second-order cybernetics (cited in Keeney, 1983, as cited in Kenny, 1988), extends the concept of feedback to the observer: Observation – of the feedback of a system – is itself the feedback of an (higher or second order) observing system. Accordingly, observation is self-referential; the observer part of, or a participant in, that which is observed, that is, a participant-observer (i.e., participant/observer). As will be demonstrated further on, although the concept of the participant/observer had already been enunciated in early systems theory developments, second-order cybernetics served to clarify and consolidate this further. Second-order cybernetics, therefore, represents an extension of the concept of feedback from early cybernetics; involving feedback of feedback or the notion of the participant/observer.

The nature of the relationship between GST and cybernetics (including second-order cybernetics) was for some time unclear. Their relationship can be elucidated as follows: In the study of wholes, GST entails the assumption that a system – defined as a system of interacting elements (or parts) – exhibits part-whole relations that are subject to a number of principles, one of which is self-regulation or feedback, that is, cybernetics (Phipps & Vorster, 2011; von Bertalanffy, 1968; Vorster, 2003). Given this, GST is superordinate to cybernetics and the original term general system theory is used to designate systems theory/cybernetics (Phipps & Vorster, 2011; Vorster, 2003).

In effect then the thesis of GST is as follows: Observation of the part-whole /interdependent (i.e., nonlineal) relations/behavior (i.e., interpsychic) of a system, including that of feedback, which is itself the feedback of an (second-order) observing system.

It was the application of GST, which helped to provide a frame reference for understanding the family, as a whole, that ultimately consolidated the field of family therapy (Phipps, 2014; Phipps & Vorster, 2011).

Field of family therapy

In the early 1960s, GST underwent rapid and intensive application in the psychotherapeutic treatment of – what Jackson (1965) referred to as “the most influential learning context” (p. 1) – the family. In the paper entitled, The Study of the Family, Don D. Jackson (1965) suggested that,

“the family is a rule-governed [homeostatic] system; that its members behave [interact] among themselves in an organized, repetitive manner and that this patterning of behaviors [interaction/s] can be abstracted as a governing principle of family life” (p. 1). Jackson (1965) had shown how GST, including the interpsychic and nonlineal perspectives as well as the

principle of self-regulation or feedback, could be applied to the study and treatment of the family. It was this thinking that helped to consolidate the field (Watzlawick & Weakland, 1977) that is referred to, in various parts of the world, as family therapy.

Today, however, family therapy has evolved as a rather broad field of study incorporating somewhat divergent approaches on the nature, diagnosis, and treatment of the family, one of these being the application of GST and the emphasis, therein, of interaction or interdependence.

Interactional approach

 As will be explained, a limitation incurred in the psychotherapeutic application of GST was the excessive emphasis placed on the family as a self-regulating system. This emphasis also tended to obscure a sine qua non of this approach, namely, the assumption of interaction, which relates to the assumption of nonlineal causality (i.e., nonlineal perspective). It was this interactional emphasis that gave rise to early pioneers referring to this approach as “interaction-oriented” (Jackson, 1965, p. 1), “interactionist approach” (Jackson, 1965, p. 1), “interactional process” (Jackson, 1965, p. 3), “interactional view” (Watzlawick & Weakland, 1977), and “interactional psychotherapy” (Jackson, 1961, p. 256). Accordingly, a more suitable designation of this approach – one that retains the earlier interactional emphasis and simultaneously circumvents the subsequent excessive emphasis on self-regulation or feedback – is the “interactional” approach (Jackson, 1965, p. 3).

Although it is somewhat theoretically arbitrary to draw a distinction between the developments of GST (including cybernetics – feedback) and communication theory (i.e., given their interdependence) as they pertain to the interactional approach, in practice it is of value here in highlighting their relative emphases and contributions.

Communication theory

A theory of communication, and the tenets thereof, was developed in the course of investigating “The problem of what sort of a thing is an organized system” (Bateson, 1972, p. 483). Specifically, the communication between two, or more, entities begins the moment in which the behaviors (verbal and nonverbal) of the other entity are perceived as responses – that is, as evoked by the sender’s message, namely, when A transmits a message (i.e., information) to B and B adjusts, modifies, aligns, or corrects the message transmitted back to A, and vice versa (Ruesch & Bateson, 1951). In other words, feedback and information are intrinsic to all communication: communication as the basis of human interaction, or a human system, involving the transmission of information (or messages) in a circular manner, thereby enabling self-correction, that is, feedback (Ruesch & Bateson, 1951).

Furthermore, in delineating the role of the observer (of a system of communication) it was proposed that:

… No scientific observer can escape being bound to his subjective way of perceiving, inasmuch as any investigator is an integral part of the communication system in which he and the observed – be it human, animal, or object – participate. (Ruesch & Bateson, 1951, p. 11)

In elaborating on this, Ruesch and Bateson (1951) stated:

Therefore, he [the physicist] was compelled to include the observer within the system studied. Similarly he found that he could understand his own ideas only when he accepted the fact that they were his, and therefore in part determined by the culture and epoch in which he was living. Thenceforward he was forced to accept the reflexive nature of his theoretical constructions – i.e., to include the theorist as well as the observer within the system studied. (p. 263)

Accordingly, any observer of a system of communication is also a participant in the system and, hence, referred to as – noted previously – a participant observer (Ruesch & Bateson, 1951, p. 59).

Also, it was said that communication itself is organized on two logical levels, that is, all the communication has two sorts of “meaning”: “On the one hand, the message is a statement or report about events at a previous moment, and on the other hand, it is a command – a cause or stimulus for events at a later moment” (Ruesch & Bateson, 1951, pp. 179–180). Put differently, the report part of the message conveys information and is therefore synonymous with the content of the message. The command part, in contrast, involves how the message is to be taken and thus has to do with the relationship or process between the communicants (Watzlawick et al., 1967).

Ultimately, given that the command aspect of the message entails communication about the report, that is, communication about communication, the command aspect represents metacommunication, that is, the command (relations or process) aspect is situated at a higher logical level than the report (or content) aspect (Vorster, 1981). Therefore, just as human communication is subject to metacommunication, it is also subject to the phenomenon of paradox.

Paradox is related to, and what Bateson (1972) identified as, an error of logical typing. Explained simply, Russell’s theory of logical types asserts that, inasmuch as no class can be a member of itself, contravention of this rule in formal discourse – referred to as an error of logical typing – generates paradox (Whitehead & Russel, 1910, as cited in Bateson, 1972), or what Bateson analogously described as “eating the menu card instead of the dinner” (Bateson, 1972, p. 280). Put differently, if a class is confused with its members a paradox is elicited; thereby vitiating the discourse. Consequently, because metacommunication is both a communication (i.e., as a member) as well as a communication about a communication (i.e., as a class), paradox is inevitable in human communication (Ruesch & Bateson, 1951).

Thus, in having identified that feedback and information are intrinsic to all communication, that communication is the basis of human interaction, or a human system, and that one, as a participant/observer in the interaction or system, can observe two levels of communication at any one time, namely, report (content) and command (relationship or process) that are subject to the phenomenon of paradox, communication theory had laid the groundwork for one of the most remarkable developments in the field of psychology and psychotherapy, that is, the notion that schizophrenia could be considered a communicational or relational disturbance.

Although a detailed examination of this is well beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that the paper entitled, Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia (Bateson, Jackson, Haley, & Weakland, 1956), proposed that schizophrenia was not necessarily a disorder of the individual (i.e., the individual’s psyche), per se, as originally thought, but rather a type of communication (i.e., involving feedback and information) between two individuals that involved paradox (or more specifically, what was referred to as a double bind) and counter-paradox (i.e., responding to a paradoxical injunction with a counter one). Consequently, the entire system of  psychodiagnosis – that is, diagnosis as a development beyond simply psycho/diagnosis – and treatment was open to revision and reinvestigation: Psychopathology – including, for example, the diagnosis of schizophrenia – could now be investigated as a communicational/relational – or interactional – disturbance.

Many of the early developments in communication theory tended to emphasize the principles of feedback and information, intrinsic to communication, as they applied to the case of two-person or dyadic interactions.

Applied general system theory

The extension of (the application of) feedback from dyadic interactions to multiple person interactions (e.g., the family) and from (the process of) communication, itself, to the (family) system functioning (Jackson, 1965) – that is, an applied GST development – served as another major development in the interactional approach. As introduced previously, Jackson (1965) proposed that the family was a system governed by feedback and was subject to the phenomenon of homeostasis called family homeostasis. In this respect, the feedback loops in a family system enabled the family to adapt to the changes in its environment, thus maintaining a dynamic equilibrium, or homeostasis:

Positive feedback into a system would amplify change in that particular system… [that is,] it would change the interactional patterns within the system. This had a destructive potential, for example, escalation of symmetrical relationships, where both participants attempted unsuccessfully to gain control of the relationship, which could end up in domestic violence or divorce (Jackson, 1984). Conversely… negative feedback loops functioned by counteracting any deviation, thereby maintaining the existing equilibrium of the system and thus ensuring its integrity and continuity (Jackson, 1967). (Vorster, 2003, p. 6) Jackson (1965), as discussed previously, considered the family to be a rule-governed system wherein the members behave together in an organized, repetitive, and patterned manner. There were three types of rules operational in a system, namely, covert norms, overt values, and metarules (or rules about the norms and values), and when a family presented with a difficulty, this was an indication that the rules, or the process of defining these rules, needed change (cited in Becvar & Becvar, 1996). Moreover, a patient’s symptoms, such as schizophrenia, had a function within the family system, that is, the member’s symptomatic behavior tended to preserve the stability or homeostasis of the family (Jackson & Weakland, 1959, as cited in Nichols & Schwartz, 1991).

Jackson (1965) emphasized though that, in attempting to infer the general principles or rules from which a family operates, it should be borne in mind that:

The rule is an inference, an abstraction – more precisely, a metaphor coined by the observer to cover the redundancy he observes. We say a rule is a “format of regularity imposed upon a complicated process by the investigator” (Haley, 1962). (p. 11)

Accordingly, and consistent with Bateson’s ideas, Jackson (1965) observed that the psychotherapist functions as a participant/observer within the system.

Jackson (1965) had extended many of Bateson’s views on communication, information, and feedback by demonstrating how they could be applied in the therapeutic context to the family system. Most importantly, the family, similarly to any other system, was governed by feedback that helped to bring about change (i.e., positive feedback) or stability (i.e., negative feedback). In this respect, a patient’s symptomatic behavior served to maintain the homeostasis of the system and, thus, any treatment needed to consider the relation of the patient to the total family system. Furthermore, the psychotherapist was a participant/observer within the system.

Although this thinking had placed excessive emphasis on self-regulation, especially homeostasis or negative feedback and, thereby, underestimating the dynamic nature of families as they evolved (Nichols & Schwartz, 1991), it nevertheless introduced the application of GST to the treatment of the family. Such was the significance of this development that it helped to consolidate the interactional approach.

The interactional approach thus involves the (trained) observation or description of interdependent (i.e., nonlineal and lineal distinction) behavior (i.e., interpsychic and intrapsychic distinction) – that is, interaction – of a human (two or more people) system exhibiting self-regulation or feedback in terms of its: (a) communication – the transmission of information (or messages); (b) functioning – stability (i.e., negative feedback) or change (i.e., positive feedback); and (c) observation – itself the self-regulation or feedback of an (second-order) observing system; such that the observer is a (selfreflexive) participant/observer.

As noted before, this represented an extraordinary development in psychology and psychotherapy: It had enabled psychopathology – including its diagnosis and treatment – as traditionally individually defined, to be observed or described as a communicational, relational, or interactional difficulty too; the observation, itself, that of a (psychotherapist) participant/observer.

Having examined the contribution of the interactional approach, attention is turned to the subsequent narrative therapy development, which is informed by postmodernism.

Postmodernism

Postmodernism is a diverse movement, spanning philosophy, literature, art, culture, film, architecture, media, economics, politics, social sciences, feminism, science, and religion (Moules, 2000). Because of the postmodern movement, the achievements of various disciplines, including those of science and philosophy, have been brought into question (Lyotard, 1984). Postmodernism entails the claim that, different to the claim in modernism¹,  there are no grounds, rational or otherwise, for the possibility of knowledge (Rorty, 1991). Postmodernism thus constitutes an extreme form of skepticism regarding the possibility of acquiring knowledge, be it scientific knowledge or any other (Cloete, 2001).

To explain further, the thesis of postmodernism is that there are no grounds for establishing what counts as true knowledge. On the premise that the act of knowing is interpretive or subjective, the knower is unable to acquire direct or objective (including neutral and universal) knowledge and, therefore, is unable to establish unequivocally its truth (Cloete, 2001). Thus, Lyotard (1984) concludes, “Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it” (p. 392). Accordingly, Lyotard defines postmodernism as extreme skepticism towards any discourse that legitimates itself with reference to a metanarrative claimed to be more fundamental, universal, ultimate, or objective. Postmodernism incorporates several different strands of thought relating to the centrality of language, constructivism, social constructionism, and poststructuralism.

Within the postmodern tradition, language is said to perform, constitute, create, bring forth, or perform reality (Benhabib, 1984; Gergen, 1994; Moules, 2000). Put differently, the knower tends – through “languaging” – to perform or bring forth the known. Furthermore, because it “is not the private property of any particular individual’s cognitive processes, but a form of game we play together, that is, the relational product of shared discursive practices and joint actions” (Wittgenstein, 1953, as cited in Botella & Herrero, 2000, p. 409), language (including interpretation and meaning) is considered a relational achievement (Botella & Herrero, 2000).

Constructivism is a tradition with a long history going back to Berkeley, Vico, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Piaget (Hoffman, 1993). It entails the view that reality (knowledge/observations of) is/are a construct of the knower (observer; Held, 1990). The act of knowing (observation) is interpretive (subjective) and thus the knower can never have objective knowledge (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).

Social constructionism, a development of constructivism, includes the assumption that reality (or discourse about reality) is an artifact of the communal interchange (Gergen, 1985): Reality is a construct held by a community of knowers (Moules, 2000). Therefore, although constructivism and social constructionism both involve the assumption that reality is a construct, the assumption in constructivism is that this construct is largely individually derived; in social constructionism, it is essentially considered to be socially derived (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).

Poststructuralism represents another dimension of postmodernism. It entails the premise that, different to the premise in structuralism²,  although deep underlying structures (which determine, explain, or engender known and ordinary human actions such as the use of language and societal organization) can be perceived, rather than reflecting an independent reality, these structures are merely inventions that constitute reality (Ally et al., 2000). Therefore, in poststructuralism, language constitutes and creates reality as opposed to reflecting it (Moules, 2000).

Postmodernism, then, with its different strands, represents a radical challenge to our taken-for-granted world; silencing the naïve, if not hubristic, modernist notion of acquiring objective knowledge (Phipps & Vorster, 2015). One of the many contributions of postmodernism is that it accentuates – if not consolidates – the notion that all knowing (perception or observation) is inescapably interpretive or subjective; highlighting that – and consistent with early developments in GST – knowledge (observation) is self-referential; the knower (observer) part of, or a participant in, that which is known (observed); that is, a participant/knower (participant/observer). Therefore, it is requisite for the psychotherapist as a participant/knower (participant/observer) to delineate his or her narrative/s (frame/s of reference) and the possible constraints thereof, in a continuously recursive way.

The emphasis, albeit renewed and strengthened, that all knowing is inescapably interpretive or subjective, contributed to the advent of narrative therapy.

Narrative therapy

In 1990 Michael White and David Epston co-authored a book, Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends, that not only set out how narrative could be applied as a metaphor in psychotherapy but also delineated the essential philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of narrative therapy³, or what White (2007) subsequently referred to as a narrative practice. The essential thesis of narrative therapy, as discussed previously, is that human beings story experience. This is done to make sense of life, to ascribe meaning, and to give expression (White & Epston, 1990). Storying is presumed to be a fundamental human experience and activity, a selective or interpretive process that shapes a living, and problems arise when the story is unrepresentative of the individual’s actual or lived experience (White, 1998). The thesis of narrative therapy is, therefore, consistent with the emphasis in postmodernism that it is the knower who performs or interprets reality, in this case by storying (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).

On closer examination though and, as introduced previously, in the way that narrative therapy applies the narrative metaphor – that is, narrative metaphor as the preferred frame of reference for the psychotherapist and psychotherapy as, thus, the narration and re-narration of the client’s narrative – it inadvertently invokes the earlier, intrapsychic perspective. As this has already been detailed in a precursor paper entitled, “Narrative Therapy: A Return to the Intrapsychic Perspective?” (Phipps & Vorster, 2011), only the key observations will now be repeated.

Philosophical background

Two additional aspects of the philosophical background to narrative therapy that require elucidation, in this regard, include social constructionism and hermeneutics. An assumption in narrative therapy is that reality is a socially negotiated story or narrative told by the individual. White (1998) elaborated, “The personal story or self-narrative is not radically invented inside our heads. Rather, it is something that is negotiated and distributed within various communities of persons and in the institutions of our culture” (p.225). Evidently, narrative therapy entails a strong social constructionist emphasis: the assumption that reality is an artifact of the social or communal interchange (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). As will be explained, although social constructionism assumes that all experience is interpretive, it does not entail an explicit assumption about the nature of that interpretation for the individual. The assumption that the individual’s experience is storied – as in narrative therapy – necessarily represents an inference about the nature of that interpretation for the individual, thereby eliciting an intrapsychic perspective (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).

Narrative therapy advocates the use of the narrative metaphor in psychotherapy, which is informed by hermeneutics. According to the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, hermeneutics entails understanding the behavior of persons in terms of their experience and inner motivation, that is, inner life (Gallagher, 2004). Anthropologist Edward Bruner (1986a), drawing on Dilthey’s hermeneutics, proposed that the way to understand how other individuals experience their culture is by interpreting their expressions, that is, their representations, performances, objectifications, or texts. Experience, Bruner (1986a) explained, structures expressions and expressions structure it. Bruner (1986b) went on to argue that it is narrative or story (as such an expression) that structures experience and experience that structures it and, accordingly, for ethnography (i.e., an approach involving descriptions of human social phenomena) as narrative. In drawing on this thinking and in, similarly, advocating psychotherapy as narrative (i.e., the application of the narrative metaphor) narrative therapy is thus informed by hermeneutics, a philosophical tradition that entails an intrapsychic emphasis (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).

Theory

In elaborating on the theory further, narrative therapy asserts that experience is storied (i.e., including a beginning, a middle, and an ending); this story constitutes or performs the individual’s reality; no story can ever incorporate the full richness of the individual’s lived experience; and problems form when the story he or she is telling – the dominant or problem-saturated story – is unrepresentative of his or her lived experience (White, 1990). As explained previously, though, the assumption that the individual’s experience is storied constitutes an inference about the nature of the interpretation for the individual, thereby drawing on an intrapsychic perspective.

Aims

A central aim of narrative therapy, as introduced previously, is to help the client to reauthor an alternative, more helpful, open-ended story (White & Epston, 1990). This relates directly to the following basic propositions of narrative therapy: experience is an interpretive act, a frame of reference is necessary for any interpretation of lived experience, and such frames of reference provide a context for experience and the attribution of meaning (White, 1998). Setting it out more completely then, the aim in narrative therapy is to assist the client to reinterpret his or her experience by helping him or her to tell a new story. Ultimately, reauthoring involves reinterpretation (of the problem) and, furthermore, unlike in the interactional approach wherein the psychotherapist limits drawing inferences about the subjective meaning associated with the new interpretation, in narrative therapy the psychotherapist does not. Thus, reauthoring entails the intrapsychic application of reinterpretation.

Method

To assist the client to reauthor a preferred story, the method employed in narrative therapy usually entails: (a) externalizing the problem (i.e., helping the client objectify and, at times, personify the problem, thereby defining it as a separate entity – external to the client or relationship that was ascribed as the problem); (b) searching for unique outcomes (i.e., other stories that fall outside the dominant story); and (c) revising the client’s relationship with the problem (i.e., ascribing new meanings to the other stories; White, 2007; White & Epston, 1990). Broadly, however, narrative therapy incorporates the application of storytelling, the telling, and retelling of a story, and the (intrapsychic) assumption that storytelling can effect significant changes in the client’s subjective experience.

What is apparent, therefore, is that the way in which narrative therapy applies the narrative metaphor, it inadvertently invokes the intrapsychic perspective. Narrative therapy incorporates: (a) an hermeneutic philosophy – and the expression, thereof, of the narrative metaphor – with an explicit intrapsychic emphasis; (b) the intrapsychic assumption that the individual’s experience is storied; and (c) the use of reinterpretation (i.e., reauthoring) and storytelling with an intrapsychic orientation (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).

Narrative therapy as intrapsychic

Narrative therapy does not distinguish between an intrapsychic and interpsychic perspective. This does not make the conclusion that narrative therapy incorporates an intrapsychic emphasis any less important. As explained previously, the intrapsychic and interpsychic perspectives delineate two distinct frames of reference for observation or description. An intrapsychic observation is one step removed from an interpsychic one, therefore the two perspectives do not delineate a binary opposition but rather two logically distinct frames of reference (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).

The strong emphasis in postmodernism that the act of knowing is inescapably interpretive or subjective seemingly precipitated, in narrative therapy, an error of logical typing by confusing: (a) the observer’s frame of reference (i.e., postmodern assumption that knowing/observing is interpretive/subjective); with (b) inferences about another observer’s frame of reference (i.e., the intrapsychic perspective). By way of illustration, then, if the psychotherapist – in applying the narrative metaphor – limited his or her observations to the observation of the client’s story (i.e., the client’s behavior); refraining from interpretation of the (subjective) meaning of this story (for the client) and refraining from invoking the assumption that this story necessarily represents the client’s subjective experience (i.e., refraining from drawing inferences about the nature of the client’s subjective experience), then this constitutes an interpsychic observation or description; logically distinct from an intrapsychic one (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). Not only is such thinking inconsistent with the essential philosophy of narrative therapy, but more importantly because it seemingly incurs an error of logical typing, no provision is made within narrative therapy to distinguish the intrapsychic from interpsychic perspective.

Therefore, observance of the postmodern assumption that the individual’s experience is necessarily subjective (i.e., as applied in narrative therapy) does not forego – as distinct from what was previously suggested (Combs & Freedman, 1998) and as introduced earlier in this paper – the need for adherence to an interpsychic perspective or the intrapsychic and interpsychic distinction for the purposes of observation (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). In conclusion, a potentially valuable phase of development from the intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective, as incorporated within the interactional approach, had been unnecessarily dismissed in the course of narrative therapy.

The claim in narrative therapy that the narrative metaphor is the preferred frame of reference for the psychotherapist also warrants further discussion. In arguing that the narrative metaphor was preferable to the system metaphor, White (1995) explained that, in contrast to the system metaphor, which simply connects “behaviour to its determinants” (p. 216) so as to “prove what did happen is what had to happen” (p 216), the narrative metaphor connects “action to its sense or meaning” (p. 216) and thus “to processes of interpretation; to how persons make sense of their experience, to how they endow their experiences of life with meaning” (p. 216). Although altogether unclear, White’s (1995) interpretation of the system metaphor as yielding only causal explanations – and, as discussed previously, a criticism of Jackson’s (1965) early application of GST to the family (Nichols & Schwartz, 1991) – “relating to the maintenance of equilibrium or homeostasis” (p. 215), that is, associated with “connecting behaviour to its determinants…that prove what did happen is what had to happen” (p. 216), seems to represent an oversimplification of the application of this metaphor and, moreover, it overlooks a sine qua non of this approach: the observation of interdependence or relationship – that is, interaction. Therefore, White’s (1995) conclusion, that the narrative metaphor was preferable to the former system metaphor, is unsubstantiated; representing instead a personal preference for the narrative metaphor as it accentuates sense, meaning, and interpretation; this again highlighting the inherent intrapsychic emphasis associated with the choice of the narrative metaphor. A second potentially important phase of development, then, that of the interactional approach – related, in part, to the application of a system metaphor – had similarly been needlessly displaced.

Contribution of narrative therapy

Notwithstanding the above conclusions, one of the most important contributions of narrative therapy is its accentuation of the frame of reference of the psychotherapist. Drawing on the postmodern thesis that, because the act of knowing (observation) is interpretive (subjective), it is the knower (observer) that tends to language, bring forth, or perform the known (observed; Benhabib, 1984; Moules, 2000), narrative therapy draws attention to the frame of reference of the psychotherapist (i.e., the applied metaphor), the choice/s thereof, and its concomitant effects on knowing (observing) in psychotherapy. Its emphasis on the frame of reference of the psychotherapist constitutes – without a doubt – a highly significant development.

Also, the emphasis in narrative therapy on sense, meaning, and interpretation serves to reemphasize the potential significance of the intrapsychic perspective in psychotherapy. Despite that this reemphasis occurred unintentionally, its occurrence invites reexamination of its possible value and how it can be logically integrated within a psychotherapeutic approach – that is, without ceding itself as an eclectic reoccurrence; erroneously foregoing the phase of development from the intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective.

Finally, as will be explained, narrative therapy also shares a special emphasis with, and is thus illuminating of, an important early intrapsychic development known as person-centered therapy, which is part of the humanistic approach.

Humanistic approach

Very briefly, emerging in the 1950s in strong reaction to the former dominant psychoanalytic and behaviorist approaches – and, thus often called the “third force” – the humanistic approach accentuates the person or (human) being of the individual: the individual is said to be unique, integrated, and whole; dignified; of positive nature; and who, as an active, conscious experiencing, and generally psychologically healthy being, is in the process of growing, striving to realize his or her potential (i.e., actualize), and to be truly himself or herself. (Meyer, Moore, & Viljoen, 1989). One of the central developments within this approach is that of person-centered therapy.

Person-centered therapy

Person-centered therapy, which was pioneered by Carl Rogers (1902–1987), entails the thesis that the individual’s (or organism’s) perceptual field is his or her reality (Rogers, 1951). The individual’s behavior is, thus, determined by his or her perception of reality and the meaning he or she attaches to this; all these experiences constituting his or her total experiential world (i.e., phenomenal field). In time, the individual develops a perception of self, a differentiated part of the phenomenal field, called the self-concept. This is the perception or “picture” that the individual has of self along with the value or regard he or she attaches to self (Meyer et al., 1989). The individual’s one essential tendency is to strive for the utmost development of potential – that is, to actualize his or her potential (i.e., the actualizing tendency) – this guided by self-concept (i.e., the self-actualizing tendency) (Meyer et al., 1989). Therefore, when the perception of self corresponds to (or is representative of) his or her total experiential world, he or she is in a state of congruence and can self-actualize. The individual, however, also has two other essential needs, including the need for positive regard (i.e., acceptance from others) and positive self-regard (i.e., acceptance of self; Meyer et al., 1989). Therefore, when the need for positive regard and/or positive selfregard conflicts with the tendency to self-actualize – for example, the expression of a specific need that elicits judgement or rejection (i.e., loss of positive regard and/or positive self-regard) – a threat is precipitated and, accordingly, the individual may not accept (i.e., not symbolize) his or her total experiential world into his or her self-concept, for example, by ignoring, distorting, or denying own experiences and needs. Because perception of self no longer corresponds to the total experiential world, the individual is in a state of incongruence, unable to self-actualize, and begins to feel threatened, anxious, and defensive.

Accordingly, the goal in person-centered therapy is to help the client develop a self-concept that is more representative of his or her total experiential world – this increased congruence enabling self-actualization – by facilitating the development of an optimal relationship – one in which the client experiences deep understanding (i.e., accurate empathy), acceptance or lack of judgement (i.e., unconditional positive regard), and trusts this, by virtue of the other person’s own authenticity or genuineness (i.e., congruence) – the psychotherapeutic relationship, itself, serving as such a relationship; thereby enabling the client, on account of the safety of this relationship, to begin revising his or her self-concept; becoming increasingly congruent and, thus, self-actualizing (Kirschenbaum & Henderson, 1990).

Examination, then, of person-centered therapy suggests that narrative therapy shares several emphases with this former, intrapsychic development as part of the humanistic approach. Besides some of the more obvious (intrapsychic) ones such as, for example, on the individual as a person, on understanding those subjective experiences presumed to be shaping the person’s life, and on the definition of the person’s problem (i.e., psychopathology) – that is, problems arise when the story the person is telling (cf. the perception or picture the person is holding) is not representative of his or her lived experience (cf. total experiential world; Phipps & Vorster, 2015) – what is important here is its emphasis on the definition of the psychotherapeutic relationship: One in which the psychotherapist assumes a respectful, humble, listening role; paying careful attention to the client’s interpretations and experiences; and, thereby, placing the client in the center of the relationship. Furthermore, the psychotherapist does not attempt to prescribe possible solutions to the client’s problem/s, but rather presumes that change, and thus the resolution of his or her problem, necessarily occurs because of the nature

and quality of their (psychotherapeutic) relationship, presently in effect. This emphasis in narrative therapy serves as a prominent reemphasis, then, of the importance of a humanistic, person-centered approach as part of psychotherapy.

Toward an integrative approach

Having refigured essential developments in the field of family therapy, it is evident that the application of general system theory (GST) – incorporating the developments from the intrapsychic to interpsychic as well as the lineal to nonlineal perspective – to the treatment of the family served ultimately to consolidate the field itself.

A limitation associated with the application of GST was the excessive emphasis on the family as a self-regulating system. This also tended to obscure a sine qua non of this approach, namely, the assumption of interaction. As a more suitable designation of this psychotherapeutic application, then, it is recommended that an earlier term, namely, the “interactional” approach (Jackson, 1965, p. 3), be retained.

The advent of narrative therapy precipitated an error of logical typing by confusing: (a) the observer’s frame of reference (i.e., observing is interpretive/ subjective); with (b) inferences about another observer’s frame of reference (i.e., the intrapsychic perspective). Therefore, observance of the assumption that the individual’s experience is necessarily subjective does not, as was mistakenly assumed, forego the need for adherence to an interpsychic perspective or the intrapsychic and interpsychic (logical) distinction for the purpose of observation (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). Accordingly, a valuable phase of development from the intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective, as incorporated within the interactional approach, was unnecessarily set aside in the advent of narrative therapy.

Furthermore, the claim in narrative therapy, that the narrative metaphor is preferable to the system one and, thus, it should now serve as the preferred frame of reference for the psychotherapist, is also misleading. White’s (1995) rationale, in this regard, not only: (a) represents an oversimplification of the application of the system metaphor and, more especially, overlooks a sine qua non of this approach, that is, the observation of interaction; but it is also (b) unsubstantiated in that it represents, simply, a personal preference for the narrative metaphor as an accentuation of sense, meaning, and interpretation, that is, as an intrapsychic emphasis. Therefore, this second important phase of development, that of the interactional approach – related, in part, to the use of a system metaphor – was similarly unnecessarily dismissed.

Having now clarified several of the misconceptions occurring with the advent of narrative therapy, it becomes clear, once again, that the interactional approach, drawing on developments in communication theory and GST, signifies an extraordinary development in psychology and psychotherapy in that it enables psychopathology – including its diagnosis and treatment – as traditionally individually defined, to be observed or described as a communicational, relational, or interactional difficulty too; the observation, itself, that of a (psychotherapist) participant/observer.

Turning attention to the philosophical development of postmodernism, one of its many contributions is that it accentuates – if not consolidates – the notion that all knowing (i.e., perception or observation) is inescapably interpretive or subjective; thereby highlighting that it is vital for the psychotherapist, as a participant/knower (participant/observer), to (try to) delineate his or her narrative (i.e., frame of reference) and the possible constraints thereof in a continually recursive way.

Notwithstanding its misconceptions, the accentuation in narrative therapy, which represents a major application of the foregoing philosophy, of the frame of reference of the psychotherapist (i.e., the applied metaphor), the choice/s thereof, and its concomitant effects on knowing (observing), constitutes – unequivocally – an extremely illuminating and significant contribution.

Furthermore, the attention in narrative therapy to sense, meaning, and interpretation helps to reemphasize the potential significance of the intrapsychic perspective in psychotherapy. Despite that this reemphasis occurred unintentionally, its occurrence attracts reconsideration of its potential value and how it can be logically integrated within a psychotherapeutic approach – that is, without yielding itself as an eclectic reoccurrence; erroneously foregoing the phase of development from the intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective.

Lastly, the placement of the client, in narrative therapy, at the center of the psychotherapeutic relationship, wherein the resolution of his or her problem is enabled by the nature and quality of their (psychotherapeutic) relationship, presently in effect, represents a profound reemphasis, then, of the significance of a humanistic, person-centered approach as part of psychotherapy. What does this refiguring, though, of essential developments in the field of psychology and psychotherapy possibly mean?

To begin with, suppose the psychotherapist is willing, just for the moment, to imagine – and, thereby, suspend his or her usual understanding that the  intrapsychic and interpsychic and lineal and nonlineal frames of reference, respectively, are mutually exclusive and, therefore, he or she must necessarily select either/or, lest observations or descriptions of human functioning devolve and precipitate, as is often true of eclectic applications, subsequent misunderstanding and confusion – that, although the intrapsychic, interpsychic, lineal, and nonlineal frames of reference are logically distinct, they are not mutually exclusive and, as result, he or she has the potential to assume all four of these frames of reference simultaneously. Suppose, too, that he or she imagines that each of these four frames of reference are applicable – directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly – to every known approach in psychology and psychotherapy and, now, imagining even further that he or she is able to express this in a humanistic, person-centered psychotherapeutic relationship, wherein the very nature and quality of this relationship, presently in effect, facilitates resolution of the client’s problem, then he or she, by way of an invitation, may just be experiencing, albeit momentarily, something of the possibility of a truly, integrative approach to psychotherapy, wherein instead of doing, he or she is a psychotherapist being. And just as clear as it may be now, the experience likely begins to fade.

Acknowledgments

This paper is the third in the series; the first paper entitled, “Narrative Therapy: A Return to the Intrapsychic Perspective?” was published in the Journal of Family Psychotherapy in 2011 and the second one entitled, “Refiguring Family Therapy: Narrative Therapy and Beyond” appeared in The Family Journal in 2015. Each paper is based on a common doctoral research project and for the purposes of logical continuity; then, this paper incorporates arguments and conclusions from the preceding ones.

This work is dedicated to Charl Vorster (1946–2014), a South African pioneer in clinical psychology and psychotherapy, whose life’s work, original thinking, and brilliance served as both the impetus and basis, in this paper, for attempting to reach beyond established ways of knowing and practicing psychotherapy.

Author declaration

The author declares no conflict of interest and, furthermore, declares that the current study was not financially supported by any institution or organization.

ORCID

Warwick D. Phipps http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2385-3447

References

Ally, M., Kruger, J., Coetzee, P., Voice, P., Delport, M., & Lange, P. (Ed.). (2000). Figures in philosophy: Only study guide for PLS206-A. Pretoria, South Africa: University of South Africa (UNISA).

Bateson, G. (1960). Minimal requirements for a theory of schizophrenia. AMA Archives of General Psychiatry, 2, 477–491. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1960.03590110001001

Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind: Collected essays in anthropology, psychiatry, evolution, and epistemology (2nd ed.). Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson.

Bateson, G. (1979). Mind and nature: A necessary unity (6th ed.). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Bateson, G., Jackson, D. D., Haley, J., & Weakland, J. (1956). Toward a theory of schizophrenia. Behavioural Science, 1, 251–264.

Becvar, D. S., & Becvar, R. J. (1996). Family therapy: A systemic integration (3rd ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

Benhabib, S. (1984). Epistemologies of postmodernism: A rejoinder to Jean-François Lyotard. New German Critique, 33, 103–126. doi:10.2307/488356

Bertrando, P. (2000). Text and context: Narrative, postmodernism and cybernetics. Journal of Family Therapy, 22, 83–104. doi:10.1111/1467-6427.00139

Botella, L., & Herrero, O. (2000). A relational constructivist approach to narrative therapy. European Journal of Psychotherapy, Counselling & Health, 3, 407–418. doi:10.1080/13642530010012048

Bruner, E. M. (1986a). Experience and its expressions. In V. W. Turner & E. M. Bruner (Eds.), The anthropology of experience (pp. 3–30). Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Bruner, E. M. (1986b). Ethnography as narrative. In V. W. Turner & E. M. Bruner (Eds.), The anthropology of experience (pp. 139–155). Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Carr, A. (1998). Michael White’s narrative therapy. Contemporary Family Therapy, 20,485–503. doi:10.1023/A:1021680116584

Cloete, M. (2001). Special tutorial letter: Epistemology and the postmodern challenge: Epistemology and ethics III: PLS302-9. Pretoria, South Africa: University of South Africa (UNISA), Department of Philosophy.

Cloete, M. (2002). Postmetaphysical versus postmodern thinking: A critical appraisal of Habermas’s debate with postmodernism (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, South Africa.

Combs, G., & Freedman, J. (1998). Tellings and retellings. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 24, 405–408. doi:10.1111/j.1752-0606.1998.tb01095.x

Gallagher, S. (2004). Hermeneutics and the cognitive sciences. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11, 162–174.

Gergen, K. J. (1985). The social constructionist movement in modern psychology. American Psychologist, 40, 266–275. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.40.3.266

Gergen, K. J. (1994). Toward transformation in social knowledge (2nd ed.). London, England: Sage.

Habermas, J. (1987). The philosophical discourse of modernity. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Haley, J. (1963). Strategies of psychotherapy (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Norton.

Hanson, B. G. (1995). General systems theory beginning with wholes. Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis.

Held, B. S. (1990). What’s in a name? Some confusions and concerns about constructivism. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 16, 179–186. doi:10.1111/jmft.1990.16.issue-2

Hoffman, L. (1993). Exchanging voices: A collaborative approach to family therapy. London, England: Karnac Books.

Inter. (2019). In English Oxford living dictionary online. Retrieved from https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/inter

Intra-. (2019). In English Oxford living dictionary online. Retrieved from https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/intra-

Jackson, D. (1961). Interactional psychotherapy. In M. Stein (Ed.), Contemporary psychotherapies (pp. 256–270). New York, NY: Free Press of Glenco.

Jackson, D. D. (1965). The study of the family. Family Process, 4, 1–20. doi:10.1111/famp.1965.4.issue-1

Kaslow, F. W. (Ed.). (1996). Handbook of relational diagnosis and dysfunctional family patterns. New York, NY: Wiley.

Kaslow, F. W., & Lebow, J. L. (Eds.). (2004). Comprehensive handbook of psychotherapy: Volume 4: Integrative/eclectic. New York, NY: Wiley.

Keeney, B. P. (1983). Aesthetics of change. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.

Kirschenbaum, H., & Henderson, V. L. (Eds.). (1990). The Carl Rogers reader: Selections from the lifetime work of America’s preeminent psychologist author of on becoming a person and client-centred therapy. London, England: Constable.

Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge (B. Bennington & B. Massumi, trans.). Manchester, England: Manchester University Press.

Meyer, W. F., Moore, C., & Viljoen, H. G. (1989). Personality theories: From Freud to Frankl. Johannesburg, South Africa: Lexicon.

Moules, N. J. (2000). Postmodernism and the sacred: Reclaiming connection in our greater-than-human worlds. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 26(2), 229–240. doi:10.1111/jmft.2000.26.issue-2

Neimeyer, R. A., & Mahoney, M. J. (1995). Constructivism in psychotherapy. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Nichols, M. P., & Schwartz, R. C. (1991). Family therapy: Concepts and methods (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

Patterson, T. (2014). A cognitive behavioural systems approach to family therapy. Journal of Family Psychotherapy, 25, 132–144. doi:10.1080/08975353.2014.910023

Phipps, W. D. (2004). Narrative theory: A bona fide ecosystemic development or a re- invention of the wheel (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Medical University of Southern Africa, Pretoria, South Africa.

Phipps, W. D. (2011). Foreword. In C. Vorster (Ed.), Impact: The story of interactional therapy (pp. v–vi). Pretoria, South Africa: Satori.

Phipps, W. D. (2014). Introduction to the special issue on the state of the art in systems family therapy. Journal of Family Psychotherapy, 25, 87–191. doi:10.1080/ 08975353.2014.909703

Phipps, W. D. (2019). Waking hypnosis as a psychotherapeutic technique. Sleep and Hypnosis: A Journal of Clinical Neuroscience and Psychopathology, 21, 188–200. doi:10.5350/sleep.hypn.2019.21.0187

Phipps, W. D., & Vorster, C. (2011). Narrative therapy: A return to the intrapsychic perspective? Journal of Family Psychotherapy, 22, 128–147. doi:10.1080/ 08975353.2011.578036

Phipps, W. D., & Vorster, C. (2015). Refiguring family therapy: Narrative therapy and beyond. The Family Journal: Counseling and Therapy for Couples and Families, 23, 254–261. doi:10.1177/1066480715572978

Psyche. Def. 1. (2019). In English Oxford living dictionary online. Retrieved from https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/psyche

Rogers, C. R. (1951). Client-centered therapy: Its current practice, implications and theory (9^th ed.). London, England: Constable.

Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Rorty, R. (1991). Objectivity, relativism and truth. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Ruesch, J., & Bateson, G. (1951). Communication: The social matrix of psychiatry (2nd ed.). New York: NY: Norton.

von Bertalanffy, L. (1955). An essay on the relativity of categories [Electronic Version]. Philosophy of Science, 22, 243–263. doi:10.1086/287440

von Bertalanffy, L. (1968). General system theory: Foundations, development, applications (Rev. ed.). New York, NY: George Braziller.

Vorster, C. (1981). Marital therapy and the “Process of communication.”. Psychotherapeia, 7, 2–4.

Vorster, C. (2003). General systems theory and psychotherapy: Beyond post-modernism.  Pretoria, South Africa: Satori.

Vorster, C. (2011). Impact: The story of interactional therapy. Pretoria, South Africa: Satori.

Watzlawick, P., Beavin, J., & Jackson, D. D. (1967). Pragmatics of human communication: A study of interactional patterns, pathologies, and paradoxes. New York, NY: Norton.

Watzlawick, P., & Weakland, J. H. (Eds.). (1977). The interactional view: Studies at the Mental Research Institute Palo Alto, 1965–74. New York, NY: Norton.

White, M. (1990). Story, knowledge, and power. In M. White & D. Epston (Eds.), Narrative means to therapeutic ends (pp. 1–37). New York, NY: Norton.

White, M. (1995). Re-authoring lives: Interviews & essays (2nd ed.). Adelaide, Australia: Dulwich Centre.

White, M. (1998). Notes on narrative metaphor & narrative therapy. In C. White & D. Denborough (Eds.), Introducing narrative therapy: A collection of practice-based writings (pp. 225–227). Adelaide, Australia: Dulwich Centre.

White, M. (2007). Maps of narrative practice. New York, NY: Norton.

White, M., & Epston, D. (1990). Narrative means to therapeutic ends. New York, NY: Norton.

Zimmerman, J. L., & Dickerson, V. C. (1994). Using a narrative metaphor: Implications for theory and clinical practice. Family Process, 33, 233–245. doi:10.1111/famp.1994.33.issue-3